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RECENT CHANGES IN CRIMINAL LAW: THE
FEDERAL INSANITY DEFENSE
The verdict of "not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity" has been the sub-
ject of controversy for many years among psychiatrists,' legal scholars,2
and the general public.3 Following the not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity
verdict in United States v. Hinckley4 Congress5 substantially altered the
insanity defense at the federal level.6
Copyright 1986, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. AMA on Insanity, 70 A.B.A.J. 32 (Feb. 1984); American Psychiatric Assoc.,
Statements on the Insanity Defense, in Issues In Forensic Psychiatry 7 (1984); W. Gaylin,
The Killing of Bonnie Garland (1982); E. Fersch, Psychology and Psychiatry in Courts
and Corrections (1980).
2. R. Gerber, The Insanity Defense (1984); D. Hermann, The Insanity Defense
(1983); Insanity Test: ABA Backs Limits on Defense, 69 A.B.A.J. 426 (1983); W. Winslade
& J. Ross, The Insanity Plea (1983); Palmore, The Insanity Defense Revisited, I I N.
Ken. L. Rev. 1 (1984); diGenova & Toensing, The Federal Insanity Defense: A Time For
Change in The Post-Hinckley Era, 24 S. Tex. L.J. 721 (1983); Dutile & Singer, What
Now For The Insanity Defense? 58 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1104 (1983); Hermann, Assault
on the Insanity Defense: Limitation on the Effectiveness and Effect of the Defense of
Insanity, 14 Rutgers L.J. 241 (1983); Morris, The Criminal Responsibility of the Mentally
Il1, 33 Syracuse L. Rev. 477 (1982); Robitscher & Haynes, In Defense of the Insanity
Defense, 31 Emory L.J. 9 (1982); Rodriguez, Lewinn & Perlin, The Insanity Defense
Under Siege: Legislative Assaults and Legal Rejoinders, 14 Rutgers L.J. 397 (1983); Singer,
Abolition of the Insanity Defense: Madness and the Criminal Law, 4 Cardozo L. Rev.
(1983); Springer, The End of Insanity, 19 Washburn L.J. 23 (1979).
3. More Muscle for Crime Fighters, Time Magazine, Oct. 29, 1984 at 74; Depressing
News, The Wash. Post Nat'l Weekly Ed., Oct. 22, 1984 at 38; Szasz, Treat Mental
Illness? It Isn't Even a Disease, U.S.A. Today, Oct. 11, 1984, at A10, col. 6; Regier,
More People Are Sick than We Ever Know, U.S.A. Today, Oct. 11, 1984, at AI0, col.
6; Kaufmen, The Insanity Plea on Trial, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1982, § 6 (Mag.) at 16;
Uncertainties Over Hinckley, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1982, at E6, § col. 6; Beach & Thomas,
Picking Between Mad and Bad, Time Magazine, Oct. 12, 1981 at 68.
4. United States v. Hinckley, 525 F.Supp. 1342 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 672 F.2d 115 (D.C.
Cir., 1982).
5. 130 Cong. Rec. S753 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984) (statement of Senator Symms); 130
Cong. Rec. S757 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984)(statement of Senator Mattingly); Roberts, High
Officials Express Outrage, Asking for New Law on Insanity Plea, N.Y. Times, June 23,
1982, at B6, col. I.
6. Continuing Appropriations, 1985-Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. 4, § 402, 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News (98 Stat.) 2057
(to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 20). The Justice Department has advised federal prosecutors
not to apply the new standard, the new burden of proof, or the new commitment procedures
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This comment will examine the changes made by Congress. Part
one will examine the new definition of insanity, which provides:
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal
statute that, at the time of the commission of the acts consti-
tuting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental
disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality
or the wrongfulness of his acts.7
Part one will be sub-divided into four areas, (a) the origins of the
insanity defense; (b) alternative definitions of insanity; (c) an analysis
of the new federal definition; and (d) a conclusion. Part two will examine
the placement of the burden of proof. The new federal law provides:
"[t]he defedant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by
clear and convincing evidence." 8 Part two will be divided into four
sections, (a) the constitutionality of placing the burden of proof on the
defendant; (b) arguments for placement of the burden of proof; (c) an
analysis of the new federal law; and (d) a conclusion.
I. DEFINING CRIMINAL INSANITY
A. The Origins of the Insanity Defense
The concept of mens rea has existed in most civilizations; Roman,
Hebrew, Greek, and Canon law all distinguished between crimes or acts
committed intentionally and those committed unintentionally. 9 Prior to
the twelfth century, however, English criminal law required neither a
general mens rea nor a specific intent for the commission of a crime.' 0
In England, the Church and the medieval universities were the major
source for, and advocates of, a mens rea element. The university scholars
were introduced to the notion of mens rea through their studies of
Roman law, which contributed the notion of moral guilt." Canon law
in cases in which the criminal conduct occurred before the date of enactment, Oct. 12,
1984. U.S. Department of Justice, Handbook on the Comprehensive Crime Control Act
of 1984 and other Criminal Statutes Enacted by the 98th Congress 58 (Dec. 1984).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Platt & Diamond, The Origins of the "Right and Wrong" Test of Criminal
Responsibility and Its Subsequent Development in the United States: An Historical Survey,
54 Calif. L. Rev. 1227, 1229-30 (1966).
10. Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 974, 977 (1932); see also Platt & Diamond,
supra note 9, at 1231; Gerber, supra note 2, at 8-12.
11. The earliest Roman legal sources such as the Twelve Tables (c. 450 B.C.),
referred only briefly to the legal incapacities, of children and the insane. In the
third century B.C. however, the Lex Aquilia, which dealt with delictual obli-
gations arising from the wrongful damage to property, contained more specific
references on accountability: "[A] man who, without negligence or malice, but
by some accident, causes damage, goes unpunished."
Platt & Diamond, supra note 9, at 1230; see also Sayre, supra note 10, at 982-83 (Roman
law was "resuscitated in the universities in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.").
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had an even greater influence on the common law.' 2 Church scholars
based their conceptualization of "wrong" upon the concept of "sin."
In order to commit a sin an individual had to be "morally blameworthy."
The Church, unlike early common law, distinguished the mental state-
mens rea-from the act committed-actus reus.3
The first [kind of freedom] is a free-will whereby he [man] can
choose and freely do good or evil .... For if man did that sin
against his will, it would not be a sin .... All men have freedom
but it is restrained in children, in fools, and in the witless who
do not have reason whereby they can choose the good or evil.' 4
The Church had separated the actus reus from the mens rea quite
early, and this distinction was integrated into the common law notion
of crime over a period of several hundred years. 5 The transition from
a criminal system employing strict liability concepts to one based upon
mens rea was initially accomplished by the use of "criminal intent,"
which by the thirteenth century was an element of most felonies. 6 As
to crimes which did not have an intent element, however, moral blame-
worthiness was not a requiste for conviction since evidence of the sta-
tutory elements of the crime was sufficient to produce a guilty verdict. 7
With the passage of time the common law began to recognize a
general mens rea concept. In order to implement this concept the law
began to formulate defenses for those situations in which the defendant
had committed the statutory elements but did not have the requisite
blameworthiness. One such defense was the plea of insanity. This defense
was based on the belief that a mental defect or disease could preclude
the element of moral blameworthiness.'" In the fourteenth century crim-
12. Sayre, supra note 10, at 983; Platt & Diamond, supra note 9, at 1233; see also
D. Hermann, The Insanity Defense 95 (1983).
13. Sayre, supra note 10, at 982-83; see also Sciolino, American Catholic: A Time
for Challenge, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1984, § 6 (Mag.) at 40, 74.
14. Michel, Ayenbit of Inwyt, or Remorse of Conscience (Morris ed. 1866), quoted
in Platt & Diamond, supra note 9, at 1233. This treatise was written in 1340.
15. Sayre, supra note 10, at 976-77, 979, 981.
But because the old records fail to set forth a mens rea as a general requisite
of criminality one must not reach the conclusion that even in the very early
times the mental element was entirely disregarded.
16. Id. at 981-82.
[T]he intent of the defendant seems to have been a material factor, even from
the very earliest times . . . [what it] seem[s] to show is that a criminal intent
was not always essential for criminality . . . . But it also appears that even in
the very earliest times the intent element could not be entirely disregarded.
17. Id.
18. Platt & Diamond, supra note 9, at 1231-33.
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inal insanity was defined as the ability to tell good from evil,' 9 and the
successful plea of insanity resulted in a royal pardon. 20 In the nineteenth
century the right-wrong and good-evil definition of insanity was affirmed
in Queen v. M'Naghten,2' however, a successful plea of insanity there-
after resulted in a verdict of not-guility-by-reason-of-insanity 2
B. The Modern Definitions of Insanity
Since the M'Naghten decision, numerous tests for legal insanity have
been formulated in an attempt to maintain a definition which comports
with our "complex and sophisticated society." ' 23 The definitions of crim-
inal insanity which were traditionally based upon the cognitive element
have been modified in many jursdictions to include both the volitional
and cognitive elements. 24 The cognitive element examines the defendant's
ability to distinguish or appreciate the nature of his actions, 25 while the
volitional element examines the defendant's ability to control his be-
havior. 26
The insanity definitions may also be categorized in terms of legal
theories. The M'Naghten right-wrong standard, a congnitive test, relies
19. Id. at 1233. An English court stated the general rule as it pertained to infants
in the fourteenth century: "[a]n infant under the age of seven years, though he be
convicted of felony, shall go free of judgment, because he knoweth not of good and evil
... .Year Book, 6 & 7 Edward 11 (1313), in 24 Selden Society 109 (1909).
20. Sayre, supra note 9, at 1004-05.
21. 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
22. Sayre, supra note 10, at 1006; Mueller, M'Naghten Remains Irreplaceable: Recent
Events in the Law of Incapacity, 50 Geo. L.J. 105 (1961)("M'Naghten's case brought us
the first complete formulation of the insanity test ...."). But see Platt & Diamond,
supra note 9, at 1236 ("In the eighteenth century, the 'good and evil' test was regularly
used in both insanity and infancy cases.").
23. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 620 (2d Cir. 1966).
24. New Hampshire employs a unique standard of criminal insanity. Under their test
it is a question of fact for the jury to decide from all the evidence. No instructions as
to the standard of legal insanity is given to the jury. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 628:
2(l) (1974); State v. Sadvari, 123 N.H. 410, 462 A.2d 102 (1983). This rule was later
adopted in the District of Columbia, Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.
1954), but was later rejected in favor of the ALl test, United States v. Brawner, 471
F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972). For a comparative analysis of the Durham and New Hampshire
rules see Weihofen, The Flowering of New Hampshire, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 356 (1955).
25. Kuh, The Insanity Defense-An Effort to Combine Law and Reason, 110 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 771, 782 (1962); see also R. Gerber, supra note 2, at 30.
26. Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 597, 2 So. 854, 866-67 (1887) ("if, by reason of
the duress of ... mental disease, he has so far lost the power to choose between right
and wrong ... that his free agency was at the time destroyed."). For a discussion of
the volitional element see Kuh, supra note 25, at 786.
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upon moral culpability, 27 and requires the jury to find that the disease
or defect was such that the defendant was not able to know that the
act was wrong. The standards which are said to be based upon "scientific
advances" or "scientific paradigms," such as the irresistible impulse
test, 2s the Durham rule,29 or the American Legal Institute (ALI)a° for-
mulation are labeled "scientific" tests.3 These tests, which employ both
the cognitive and volitional elements, rely upon experts to determine
insanity.3 2 Finally, those that would abolish the insanity defense, the
abolitionists, rely upon a theory of criminal law which does not require
moral culpability. They only allow the defendant to introduce evidence
of insanity to prove that he lacked the "specific intent" element and
do not allow a finding of insanity which would preclude criminal culp-
ability.33 The abolitionists advocate a criminal law which closely resembles
thirteenth century common law, a law which does not require moral
guilt as a requisite element for criminal behavior.
27. It is labeled the moral standard because it allows the jury to determine sanity,
Kuh, supra note 25, at 784-85; W. Lafave & A. Scott, Criminal Law § 37, at 281 (1972);
Bonnie, The Moral Basis of the Insanity Defense, 69 A.B.A.J. 194 (1983); Mueller, supra
note 22, at 113.
28. Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854 (1887).
29. The Durham rule states "that an accused is not criminally responsible if his
unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect." Durham v. United
States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954), overruled, United States v. Brawner, 471
F.2d 969 (D.C. App. 1972)(court adopted the ALl test).
30. See infra text accompanying note 57.
31. The label "scientific" merely relates to the origin of the standard, such as the
irresistible impulse test, which was formulated by scientists and doctors. J. Hall, General
Principles of Criminal Law 450-53 (2d ed. 1960). This label is not, however, intended to
recognize the validity of these standards. What may have been considered valid yesterday
may today be superseded by some newer "scientific" concept. Id. at 487-89. Dr. Thomas
Szasz, a noted psychiatrist, explains why:
Emotional disorders, mental illnesses, or whatever terms psychiatriasts choose,
are not real, objectively demonstrable diseases. Instead mental illness are disease
sounding names that refer to certain repertoires of human behavior, especially
to behavior considered by psychiatrists (and others), to be undersirable or "sick."
... What counts as "mental illness" is simply not the sort of thing people
usually mean by an illness. This is so obvious that it is embarrassing to try to
demonstrate it .... By accepting psychiatric disinformation as scientific research,
the American people are making a terrible mistake.
Szasz, supra note 3, at AI0 col. 6.
32. The Durham rule promoted the use of experts and was eventually rejected because
the juries were overly influenced by that testimony. The expert testimony prevented the
jury from making an ethical and legal judgment, and lead to the jury's adoption of
"scientific" models of insanity. Brawner, 471 F.2d at 983. The irresistible impulse and
ALI tests on the other hand offered a narrower "scientific" approach because they limit
the scope of the expert's testimony to the volitional or cognitive elements.
33. Morris, supra note 2, at 511; R. Gerber, supra note 2, at 81-82.
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1. The Moral Approach
The moral definition of insanity is premised upon the belief that
an accused who cannot comprehend the wrongfulness of his action cannot
be held criminally responsible for his acts, since he is incapable of
formulating a state of mind which allows him to distinguish good and
evil; he lacks the requisite mens rea or "moral guilt." This standard
"leave[s] the question to the jury, whether the party accused had a
sufficient degree of reason to know that he was doing an act that was
wrong." 3 4
The moral definitions of insanity, such as M'Naghten or the new
federal standard, are narrow. Sanity is the ability to appreciate, know,
or distinguish right from wrong. 35 It has been criticized by legal scholars
and psychologists as vague, medically unsound, and a hindrance to
expert testimomy. 36 However, public, judicial, and the medical com-
munity's dissatisfaction with "scientific" tests which broadened the in-
sanity defense, as evidenced by cases such as United States v. Hinckley,37
has revived public and legislative interest in these formulations.38 The
moral standard is presently employed by twenty states39 and the federal
34. M'Naghten, 10 Cl. & Fin. at 211, 8 Eng. Rep. at 723; see also Hall, supra note
31, at 479.
35. The M'Naghten test provides:
[T]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved
that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring
under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the
nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if he did know it that he did
not know he was doing what was wrong.
10 Cl. & Finn. at 210, 8 Eng. Rep. at 722.
36. R. Gerber, supra note 2, at 30; D. Hermann, The Insanity Defense 36-38.
37. 525 F. Supp. 1342. For a discussion of the Hinckley verdict see Taylor, Jury
Finds Hinckley Not Guilty, Accepting His Defense of Insanity, N.Y. Times, June 22,
1982, at Al, col. 5; Taylor, Hinckley Ordered to U.S. Hospital For Mental Tests, N.
Y. Times, June 23, 1982, at Al, col. 4; Beach & Thomas, supra note 3, at 68. For a
discussion of insanity verdicts see W. Winslade & J. Ross, supra note 2.
38. United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243 (5th Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct.
323 (1984)(the fifth circuit adopted a M'Naghten-styled insanity defense); see supra notes
I & 2.
39. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-502(a)(Supp. 1984); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-8-101 (Supp.
1984); Ferguson v. State, 417 So. 2d 631, 634 (Fla. 1982); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-3-2
(1984); I1. Ann. Stat. ch. 38 § 6-2 (Supp. 1984); Iowa Code Ann. § 701.4 (Supp. 1984);
State v. Smith, 223 Kan. 203, 574 P. 2d 548 (1977); La. R.S. § 14: 14 (1951); Minn.
Stat. Ann. § 611.026 (Supp. 1984); Hill v. State, 339 So. 2d 1382 (Miss. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 987 (1977); State v. Jacobs, 190 Neb. 4, 205 N.W. 2d 662, cert denied,
414 U.S. 860 (1973); Nev. Rev. Stat. tit. 16 § 194.010(3) & (4) (1981); see also Singleton
v. State, 90 Nev. 216, 522 P. 2d 1221 (1974); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C: 4-1 (1982); State
v. Williard, 292 N.C. 567, 579, 234 S.E. 2d 587, 594 (1977); State v. Staten, 18 Ohio
St. 2d 13, 247 N.E. 2d 293 (1969); In re M.E., 584 P. 2d 1340 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert
denied sub nom, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 436 U.S. 921 (1978); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 18 §
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courts.40
Proponents of the moral definition argue that its advantages are
numerous. They argue that it provides a narrower insanity defense
because it does not use the volitional "control" element, and that it
separates the criminal definition of insanity from the medical definition
of insanity.41 Moreover, they argue that it links the insanity defense to
the concept of moral guilt by excusing only those individuals who cannot
appreciate the wrongfulness of their behavior. 42 Additionally, the
M'Naghten standard reduces the use of the insanity defense as a trial
tactic by which the defendant can introduce evidence to soften up the
jury in order to obtain a more lenient sentence 3.4
2. The "Scientific" Approach
Twenty-five states and the District of Columbia have adopted ex-
panded, "scientific" definitions of insanity." The shift from the tra-
ditional M'Naghten right-wrong formulation has effected a reliance upon
the testimony of experts. 45 This shift went through two phases. The first
was the incorporation of the volitional element. This was initially ac-
complished when states adopted the irresistible impulse definition of
insanity.46 The second phase, epitomized by the Durham defintion of
insanity,471 was the equating of the definition of criminal mental disease
or defect, a medically recognized symptom which interfered with the
315(b) (1983); State v. Law, 270 S.C. 664, 244 S.E. 2d 302 (1978); S.D. Codified Laws
Ann. §§ 22-1-2(18a), 22-3-1(3) (Supp. 1984); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 8.01 (1974) & Supp.
1984); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A: 12.010 (1977).
40. See supra text accompanying note 7.
41. "[l]t is always necessary to start any discussion of M'Naghten by stressing that
the case does not state a test of psychosis or mental illess. Rather, it lists conditions
under which those who are mentally diseased will be relieved from criminal responsibility."
Livermore & Meehl, The Virtues of M'Naghten, 51 Minn. L. Rev. 789, 800 (1967); Szasz,
supra note 2; see also A. Goldstein, The Insanity Defense 60, 61 (1967).
42. J. Hall, supra note 31, at 476-79.
43. Beach & Thomas, supra note 3, at 68 (Hinckley will plead insanity in "hopes
of winning a shorter sentence even if his insanity plea is rejected."); W. Gaylin, supra
note 1, at 204 (defense attorney in murder trial pleaded insanity to "soften up the jury.");
J. Hall, supra note 31, at 480-81.
44. See infra notes 49, 56. Although Congress redefined the definition of insanity,
that definition is not applicable for violations of the D.C. Code. Telephone interview
with Mr. Adelman, U.S. Attorneys Office, U.S. Court House, 3d Street and Constitution
Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001 (November 18, 1985).
45. Continuing Appropriations 1985-Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. 4, § 402-Legislative History, 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News-Legislative History 230 [hereinafter cited as Legislative History].
46. See supra note 26.
47. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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ability to know right from wrong, with medical definitions of mental
disease or defect, any curable or recognizable pattern of behavior. The
ALI definition, although narrower than Durham, incorporates the vo-
litional element and continues to rely on medical definitions of insanity.
48
The irresistible impluse definition, the first to use a "scientific"
approach,49 is premised upon the belief that if an individual, although
knowing that his act is wrong, is not morally blameworthy if he is
unable to control his behavior because of a mental disease. The volitional
element as used in this definition is a narrow test because it requires
total impairment of either the cognitive-moral element or the volitional-
control element.50
The irresistible impulse test has been criticized as being too narrow
by those who advocate a more liberal insanity defense, because it requires
total impairment of the elements." It has also been criticized by those
who advocate an insanity defense consistent with the mens rea-culpablity
theory of criminal law. First, they argue that this formulation broadens
the defense beyond a common sense conception of justice. 2 As Livermore
and Meehl point out, the "important point is that from the standpoint
of the community's sense of justice ...we are understandably reluctant
to exculpate a criminal action on the ground that although the person
performed it knowing it was criminal he was impelled to do so by
strong criminal motives or emotions."" Second, they argue that the
volitional prong separates the insanity defense from the notion of "moral
guilt" since an impairment of the volitional element does not mean that
the ability of a defendant to perceive right from wrong was impaired .
4
Under the irresistible impulse test, an individual may avoid criminal
responsibility even if he has the ability to know that he should not have
committed the act. Finally, even the proponents of the "scientific" tests
have began to criticize the use of the volitional element. Given present
technology they do not believe that irresistible impulses can be distin-
guished from those which are merely not resisted."
48. See infra note 57.
49. See supra note 26. At present only two states use the irresistible impulse test.
State v. White, 58 N.M. 324, 270 P. 2d 727 (1954); Thompson v. Commonwealth, 193
Va. 704, 70 S.E. 2d 284 (1952).
50. W. Lafave & A. Scott, supra note 27, at 284-85.
51. Id.; see also R. Gerber, supra note 2, at 38-39.
52. J. Hall, supra note 31, at 487-88.
53. Livermore & Meehl, supra note 41, at 823.
54. W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 27, at 285-86; J. Hall, supra note 31, at 495;
Livermore & Meehl, supra note 41, at 816.
55. Legislative History, supra note 45, at 228, 231; United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d
at 248-50; American Psych. Assoc., supra note I, at 1l("The line between resistible
impulse and an impulse not resisted is probably no sharper than that between twilight
[Vol. 46
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The American Law Institute's (ALl) definition of insanity is the
most recent "scientific" test and presently is the most popular standard
used by twenty-three states.5 6 The ALl definition, unlike either the
irresistible impulse test which requires total impairment of either the
cognitive element or the volitional element or the Durham rule which
requires only that the unlawful act be a product of a mental disease,
requires that the accused lack "substantial capacity. '5 7 Critics of the
ALl definition, in addition to restating those arguments originally di-
rected at the irresistible impulse test, have attacked this standard for
failing to provide the juror with sufficient guidance. In an opinion
dissenting to the adoption of the ALI standard, Judge Trask of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal wrote: "[h]ow is the jury to know what
'substantial' means? How does anyone know except the user? ... The
jury could believe that a twenty-five percent lack of capacity is 'sub-
stantial' and acquit one who is otherwise morally responsible." 58 On
the other hand, those who advocate a "scientific" definition complain
and dusk."); Bonnie, supra note 27, at 196; J. Hall, supra note 31, 487-89, 496; but see
A. Goldstein, supra note 41, at 74 (93% of a group of psychiatrist believed that there
are cases in which the offenders were incapable of controlling themselves).
56. Ala. Code § 13A-3-1 (1983); Alaska Stat. § 12.47.010 (1984)(employs ALl standard
in conjunction with guilty but mentally ill verdict); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-601 (1977);
People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 583 P. 2d 1318, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1978); Conn. Gen.
Stat. Ann. § 53a-13 (Supp. 1984); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11 § 401 (Supp. 1984)(combines
ALI test with guilty but mentally ill verdict); Bethea v. United States, 365 A. 2d 64, 79
(D.C. App. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 704-400 (1976);
Ind. Code Ann. § 35-3-6 (1979); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 504.020 (1984); Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 17-A § 39 (1983); Md. Health Gen. Code Ann. § 12-108 (Supp. 1984); Com-
monwealth v. Mchoul, 352 Mass. 554, 226 N.E. 2d 556 (1967); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 768.21a(l) (1982); Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 552.010, 552.030 (Supp. 1985); N.Y. Penal Law
§ 40.15 (Supp. 1984); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-04-03 (Supp. 1983); Or. Rev. Stat. §
161.295 (1985); State v. Johnson, 121 R.I. 254, 399 A. 469 (1979); Graham v. State, 547
S.W.2d 531 (Tenn. 1977); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13 § 4801 (Supp. 1984); State v. Grim, 156
W. Va. 615, 195 S.E. 2d 637 (1973), overruled on other gounds, State v. Nuckolls, 273
S.E.2d 87, 91 n.6 (W. Va. 1980); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 971.15 (1971); Wyo. Stat. § 7-11-
304 (Supp. 1984).
57. Section 4.01 of the American Law Institute Penal Code provides:
(I) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform,
his conduct to the requirement of the law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or defect" do not
include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-
social conduct.
58. Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 77 (9th Cir. 1970)(Trask, J., dissenting);
Hall, Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility, 65 Yale L.J. 761, 777 (1956) ("With due
deference, I submit that these proposals [ALI tests] either amount to a merely verbal
reformulation of the 'irresistible impulse' test, or else are so general and nebulous as to
amount to the abolition of all rules.").
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that the ALl formulation does not reflect the most current "scientific"
paradigm. Although the ALI definition recognizes that total impairment
is not necessary for an individual to be criminally insane, it still treats
the cognitive and volitional elements as separate entities instead of
employing the current medical approaches which support a holistic con-
cept viewing the volitional and cognitive elements as indivisible. 9 Most
of these critics advocate an insanity test which is consonant with medical
and psychiatric theories of responsibility. 6° The ALI standard, which
originated as a compromise, 6' has not satisfied either those who prefer
a broad "scientific" insanity defense or those who advocate a moral
definition.
It is this author's opinion that the failure to align these "scientific-
medical" definitions with the criminal law concept of mens rea justifies
their rejection. Criminal liability is imposed for the intentional or reckless
commission of forbidden acts. An act is imputed to a person because
he voluntarily brought it about. To say that he voluntarily brought it
about is to say that normal intelligence was involved in the conduct.
Under the moral definition the mental disease or defect must interfere
with normal intelligence or common sense. A verdict of not-guility-by-
reason-of-insanity reflects the fact that the interference is such that the
accused cannot distinguish right from wrong. 62
Under the "scientific-medical" definitions, on the other hand, the
defendant may be found insane even though his common sense or normal
intelligence remain intact. An accused, therefore, may be found innocent
on grounds of insanity even though he understands that it is wrong to
kill, rob, or rape, because the jury is told to find him insane if a mental
disease or defect caused or was the substantial cause of his behavior.
Under the "scientific" test the causation element is the disease, and
that disease does not necessarily interfere with those elements which
criminal law postulates as the requirements for voluntary behavior. 63
The "scientific" definition rejects criminal law concepts of responsibility
and the common sense notion that voluntary behavior stems from the
ability to know the nature of the act.
The Anglo-American criminal law requires moral culpability. The
notion of culpability presumes that man acts voluntarily. If the definition
of insanity does not require the impairment of those elements which
gives man the capacity to act in a voluntary manner the defense is
expanded beyond the principle which justifies its existence. Congress'
59. D. Hermann, supra note 2, at 142.
60. Id.
61. J. Hall, supra note 31, at 516.
62. Id. at 408.
63. Id.
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formulation of criminal insanity realignes the defense with the concept
of moral blameworthiness-mens rea.
3. The Abolitionist Approach
Three states have abolished insanity as a defense. 64 There are two
schools of thought as to how the law should go about abolishing the
defense. The first argues that evidence of insanity should only be
introduced to negate the specific intent element of the criminal statute
under which the defendant is charged. 65 The second would modify the
defense of insanity so that instead of precluding criminal liability, it
results in a "guilty but mentally ill" verdict. 66 Abolitionists believe that
a restructuring of the insanity defense will realign the defense with the
mens rea element 67 and reduce the use of expert testimony at trial. 68
This restructuring, however, may instead make criminals out of those
who are incapable of being morally blameworthy69 and still allow the
defendant to use expert testimony to prove that he lacked the mental
elements of the crime charged. 70
Both of the abolitionists' approaches adopt a definition of mens rea
which does not reflect the more rational and historically grounded ap-
proach which defines mens rea as moral culpability and require its presence
for the commission of a criminal act whether the crime is one of specific
64. Idaho Code § 18-207 (1984); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 45-2-10 (28), 46-14-2001 (1983);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 (Supp. 1983). Montana abolished the defense at the trial
level but will allow the sentencing court to acquit the accused if they find him to be
insane. See Comment, After Abolition: The Present State of the Insanity Defense in
Montana, 45 Mont. L. Rev. 134, 141 (1984). Legislation introduced into the United States
Senate by Senator Strom Thurmond would have abolished the defense of insanity in
federal courts, S. 2390, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. (1982). This bill was reintroduced as S. 105,
98th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1983) and reported out on August 5, 1983 as part of Title IV of
S. 1762, 98th Cong. 1st. Sess. (1983).
65. Morris, supra note 2, at 510-11.
66. diGenova & Toensing, supra note 2, at 731-32.
67. Id. at 500-02. Morris defines mens rea to mean only the specific mental state
contained in the crime. See also R.Gerber, supra note 2, at 57.
68. Comment, supra note 63, 45 Mont. L. Rev. 134 at 137.
69. R. Gerber, supra note 2, at 57-58; Livermore and Meehl suggest:
[Abolition] would either permit the assessment of moral blame where it is
inappropriate or would cut loose the criminal law from its moorings of con-
demnation for moral failure. Once one has started down this road, there is no
defensible stopping point short of strict liability with the question of culpability
being raised at the stage of disposition.
Livermore & Meehl, supra note 41, at 797.
70. Montana, which has abolished the insanity defense, still allows experts to testify
on the accused's sanity to prove that he did not have the state of mind which is an
element of the crime, Mont. Code Ann. § 46-14-102; see also State v. Doney, 636 P.2d
1377 (Mont. 1981).
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intent, general intent, or criminal negligence. 7' Under the first approach
mens rea is defined as the "specific intent" element enumerated in criminal
statutes. Application of this theory makes crime morally neutral, referring
not to a "morally guilty mind, but only to the specific mental state con-
tained in the statutory definition of the crime committed. ' 72 The second
approach also fails to define mens rea properly. 73 Although this approach
retains a definition of insanity, such as M'Naghten or the ALI, the defend-
ant, if found to be insane pursuant to these definitions, is still subject to
criminal penalties. Under the later approach the defendant is sentenced as
a criminal and the only distinction between the sane and insane criminal
is that the later will receive some form of psychological treatment. 74 This
approach may impose criminal sanctions upon indviduals who are not mor-
ally blameworthy, since some of the individuals who are insane may be
unable to distinguish right from wrong.
None of the recent statutes abolishing the insanity defense have been
found unconstitutional, although three states have held that the Due
Process Clause requires that some form of the insanity defense be
available. 75 Judge Palmore, former Chief Justice for the Supreme Court
of Kentucky, noted that abolition "may very well be unconstitutional
unless it is supplemented by some kind of procedure .... "76 The
abolitionists' approaches should not be adopted even if it is constitu-
tionally valid to abolish the insanity defense. Unlike the criticism which
has been leveled against the volitional element for its overbreadth, ab-
olition effectively discards any notion of "moral blameworthiness" in
71. Pound, introduction to F. Sayre, Cases on Criminal Law xxxvi-xxxvii (1927); J.
Hall, supra note 31, at 449.
72. R. Gerber, supra note 2, at 57.
73. No state has adopted a guilty but mentally ill (GBMI) verdict which abolishes
the defense of insanity. However, several states have adopted a modified version which
supplements the insanity defense with the alternative GBMI verdict, Alaska Stat. § 12.47.010
(Supp. 1984); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 401 (Supp. 1984); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-7-131
(Supp. 1984); Ill. Stat. Ann. Ch. 38, §§ 113-4, 1005-2-6 (Supp. 1984); Ind. Code Ann.
35-36-23 (Supp. 1983); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 504.120(1984); Mich. Comp. Laws § 768.36
(1982). The GBMI verdict provides an alternative to the choice of guilty or insane. It
recognizes a third category whereby an accused is held criminally responsible while still
assuring some consideration of defendant's mental state at the sentencing stage. For a
discussion of the GBMI verdict see Hermann, supra note 2, at 360-69; Note, The Guilty
But Mentally Ill Verdict and Due Process, 92 Yale L.J. 475 (1983).
Legal commentators have suggested that this supplemental approach will erode the
insanity defense by encouraging the jury to "compromise on its verdict and by creating
jury confusion." Id. at 362; see also Comment, Guilty but Mentally Ill: A Reasonable
Compromise for Pennsylvania, 85 Dick. L. Rev. 289, 307 (1981).
74. diGenova & Toensing, supra note 2, at 731-32.
75. State v. Lange, 168 La. 957, 123 So. 639 (1929); Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss.
142, 132 So. 581 (1931); State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020 (1910).
76. Palmore, supra note 2, at 14.
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relation to those who suffer from a mental disease or defect. To the
extent society defines crime as consisting of mens rea-moral guilt-
and an actus reus-morally wrong act-insanity cannot and should not
be abolished as a defense.
77
C. The New Federal Standard
Until Public Law 98-473, Congress had never enacted legislation
which defined criminal insanity,78 and the Supreme Court for the most
part left development of the insanity definition to the federal courts of
appeal. 79 During this period the appellate courts used various definitions,
and at the time this bill was enacted the ALI definition of insanity was
the test employed by most federal courts. 0
The legislative history suggests that the new standard was adopted
to rectify three problems: first, to reduce the scope of expert testimony;8'
second, to require total impairment of the cognitive element so that
diminished capacity would not constitute legal insanity; 2 and finally, to
exclude certain symptoms, which the medical community considers in-
dicative of mental disease, from ever being considered as a mental disease
for the purpose of legal insanity. 83
77. Pound, supra note 71, at xxxvi-xxxvii ("Historically our substantive criminal law
is based upon a theory of punishing the vicious will. It postulates a free agent confronted
with a choice between doing right and doing wrong and choosing freely to do wrong.");
but cf. 0. Holmes, The Common Law 36 (M. Howe ed. 1963) ("The first requirement
of a sound of law is, that it should correspond with the actual feelings and demands of
the community, whether right or wrong."); see also Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33
Col. L. Rev. 55, 78 (1933) ("No one charged with a police offense, is likely to try to
prove himself insane in order to escape the payments of a light fine .... Should it do
so [raise the defense of insanity] the lunatic sufficiently sane to go at large should
presumably be subject to a light fine if he violates police regulations.").
78. Legislative History, supra note 45, at 225.
79. Id.; United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d at 247-48.
80. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966) (employs "wrongfulness"
instead of "criminality"); United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961) (does
not use "to appreciate the criminality of his conduct"); United States v. Chandler, 393
F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1968); Blake v. United States, 407 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1968) (adopts ALI (1) only); United States v.
Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1967) (uses "wrongfulness" instead of "criminality");
Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970) (adopts ALI (1) only and replaces
"criminality" with "wrongfulness"); Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1963)
(adopts ALI (1) only and replaces "criminality" with "wrongfulness"); United States v.
Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (adopts ALI (1) only); but see United
States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243 in which the Fifth Circuit rejected ALl formulation in
favor of the M'Naghten test.
81. Legislative History, supra note 45, at 227-228.
82. Id. at 231.
83. Id.
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The new definition of insanity reduces the use of expert testimony
by discarding the cognitive-volitional "scientific" definition in favor of
the cognitive "moral" definition. The battle of experts was a major
concern: "Indeed the disagreement of experts is so basic that it makes
rational deliberation by the jury virtually impossible. 8 4 Congress cited
the volitional element as the source of confusing testimony." Although
the volitional-control element is phrased in scientific terms, typically
implying a degree of scientific accuracy, such accuracy does not exist
in the field of psychiatry.8 6 Psychiatry is not an exact science, and both
the irresistible impulse and the ALI definition, which rely upon psy-
chiatric models of sanity, had generated a debate among experts. Richard
J. Bonnie, Professor of Law and Director of the Institute of Law,
Psychiatry, and Public Policy at the University of Virginia explained
the fundamental difficulty involved: "Unfortunately, however, there is
no scientific basis for measuring a person's capacity for self-control or
for calibrating the impairment of such capacity .... Whatever the precise
terms of the volitional test, the question is unanswerable-or can be
answered only by moral guess." 8 7 Essentially the courts have allowed
psychiatrists to testify as experts on issues where no proven expertise
exists, thus allowing them to espouse their own concepts of right and
wrong. By rejecting the volitional element Congress has significantly
reduced the role psychiatrists will play in criminal trials.
A second result desired by Congress was the elimination of an
insanity verdict when the defendant suffers only from "diminished re-
sponsibility." 8 8 The diminished capacity defense originated in California
and is commonly referred to as the Wells-Gorshen rule, a reference to
the cases which formulated the rule. 9 Under this rule, "evidence of
diminished mental capacity, whether caused by intoxication, trauma or
84. Id. at 225.
85. Congress has also amended the Federal Rules of Evidence to reduce the use of
expert testimony in relation to the insanity defense. Federal Rule of Evidence 704 has
been amended to read:
No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a
defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether
the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an
element of the crime of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for
the trier of facts alone.
Id. at 232 (quoting The Insanity Defense Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. pp. 276-77 (1982)).
86. Id. at 226-29.
87. Id. at 226-27 (quoting The Insanity Defense Hearings before the Committee on
the Judiciary, United States Senate, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. pp. 276-77 (1982)).
88. Id. at 231. For a general discussion of the diminished capacity defense see also
Morris, supra note 2, at 499-512.
89. People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 836 (1949);
People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959).
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disease, can be used to show that a defendant did not have a specific
mental state essential to an offense." 90 The legislative history indicates
that Congress does not want the federal courts to adopt the diminished
capacity defense which evolved in California due to judicial dissatisfac-
tion with the M'Naghten test. 91 The text of the new statute makes no
reference to diminished capacity, but does require that the accused, in
order to be found criminally insane, be "unable to appreciate the nature
and quality or wrongfulness of his acts." ' 92 The new standard, because
it requires the total impairment of the cognitive element, unlike the
diminished capacity test which only requires partial impairment, should,
even without an examination of Congressional intent, prevent the courts
from adopting the diminished capacity defense. 93 The new standard
allows expert testimony on the nature and character of a defendant's
symptoms and allocates to the jury the dispositive issue of legal insanity
which should only be found if the accused is unable to distinguish
between right and wrong.
Finally, the standard narrows the scope of "mental disease or defect"
by prefacing that phrase with the word "severe.'' 94 Congress specifically
intended to exclude certain mental diseases from the scope of judicial
inquiry. "The concept of severity was added to emphasize that non-
psychotic behavior, or neuroses such as 'inadequate personality,' 'im-
mature personality,' or a pattern of 'anti-social tendencies' do not
constitute the defense. The committee also intends that ... the voluntary
use of alcohol or drugs .. .does not constitute insanity .. .
This author suggests that the use of the term "severe" is unnecessary.
The mental diseases cited to justify the addition of the term "severe"
constitute legal insanity only under tests which employ the volitional
element. 96 All the diseases cited by Congress can be traced to the
defendant's inability to control his behavior. Thus it seems that only
90. People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 316, 411 P.2d 911, 914, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815,
818 (1966).
91. See Comment, Diminished Capacity and California's New Insanity Test, 10 Pacific
L.J. 751, 768-69 (1979).
92. Legislative History, supra note 45, at 227.
93. Id. at 231.
94. Id.
95. Id. For a discussion of drugs and criminal insanity see H. Fingarette & A. Hasse,
Mental Disabilities and Criminal Responsibility 137-172 (1979).
96. Brinkley v. United States, 498 F.2d 505, 511-12 (8th Cir. 1974) (remanded under
a volitional type test to explore possibility that the use of LSD might constitute insanity);
United States v. Bass, 490 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1974) (allowed evidence of addiction to be
introduced on the issue of insanity); Green v. United State, 383 F.2d 199 (D.C.Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 961 (1968) (receiving evidence of addition as evidence of insanity).
For a general discussing of the volitional-control element see Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S.
514, 88 S. Ct. 2145 (1968); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S. Ct. 1417 (1962).
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those standards using the volitional element would label such acts a
mental disease or defect9 7 while definitions like the new federal statute,
which require total impairment of the cognitive element, would auto-
matically exclude such diseases.
Congress has replaced the M'Naghten phrase "know" with "ap-
preciate." The legislative history does not indicate the rationale for this
shift. However, the controversy and dispute regarding the proper def-
inition of "Know," as used in M'Naghten, is one plausible explanation.98
"Know" can be interpreted to mean either an actual understanding that
the act committed was a crime, or it can mean the inability to perceive
that the act was morally wrong. 99 Under the first definition, if the
accused suffers from a disease which makes him believe he must kill,
he would be considered insane even though he knew that killing is
wrong.' °° Under the second definition a disease which merely distorted
the accused's own notion of right and wrong but does not interfere
with the accused's ability to perceive what the law or general morality
says is right or wrong would be considered criminally sane even though
the medical community may deem him insane."'
The term "appreciate," however, does not, by itself, indicate a
preference for either definition. 0 2 It is this author's opinion that the
federal courts, when faced with this issue, should adopt the second
definition. Since Congress intended to adopt a more restrictive definition
of insanity, it would be logical to assume that they also intended to
adopt the narrower definition of "Know." Moreover, an inability to
perceive that an act, usually murder, is morally wrong is the definition
of "Know" used by the M'Naghten court in its formulation of the
test.'0 3 Finally, it is the most reasonable definition. This definition rep-
97. See supra notes 95-96.
98. Jurisdictions using the broad formulation require that the accused actually un-
derstand that the act is wrong. See e.g., People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 195, 394 P.2d 959,
40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964). Those jurisdictions adopting the narrower approach simply give
the term "know" to the jury without an explanation, leaving it to the jury to "find the
'common sense' meaning from their own backgrounds .... A. Goldstein, supra note
41, at 50.
99. W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 27, at 276.
100. State v. Essen, 16 Wis. 2d 567, 598-99, 115 N.W.2d 505, 521-22 (1962).
101. State v. Kirkham, 7 Utah 2d 108, 110 319 P.2d 859, 860 (1958).
102. Judges have used the terms appreciate and know interchangeably, J. Hall, supra
note 31, at 482; thus it would seem that the use of "appreciate" does not reflect a
legislative choice on this issue of interpretation. But see A. Goldstein, supra note 41, at
49-50 (argues that the term "appreciate" conveys a broader definition of know).
103. The court in M'Naghten found that:
If the question were to be put as to the knowledge of the accused solely and
exclusively with reference to the law of the land, it might tend to confound
the jury, by inducing them to believe that an actual knowledge of the law of
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resents the "common sense notion of daily life.''" 4 The mere fact that
an individual honestly believes that it is right to kill and the medical
community says that it was caused by a "disease," without more, cannot
excuse such action. Criminal insanity should not recognize as insane a
distorted perception of right or wrong, but should only recognize sit-
uations where the accused is unable to "know," "appreciate," "com-
prehend," or "perceive" the fact that his acts are contrary to the law
or general morality.' 0
D. Conclusion
The insanity defense rests upon the premise that punishment for
wrongful deeds should be predicated on moral culpability. Thus the
definition of criminal insanity should reflect the common sense as well
as the rational conceptualization of moral culpability. Until the late
nineteenth century, the right-wrong test was the standard.' °6 The courts,
in order to formulate a standard which would reflect a "sophisticated
and modern" civilization, attempted to meld current "scientific" con-
cepts with the more traditional notions of moral culpability; this did
not produce an acceptable test of insanity. Congress' adoption of the
right-wrong test realigns the insanity defense with criminal theory, the
historically proper definition of mens rea, and a common sense notion
of moral culpability.
II. BURDEN OF PROOF IN THE INSANITY DEFENSE
Both federal and state courts place the initial burden of proof upon
the accused but then differ as to who bears the burden of persuasion.
Satisfying the burden of proof is a two-step process. First, the initial
burden of going forward with evidence and second, the burden of
persuasion. If an accused pleads insanity and fails to meet the initial
burden of going forward with evidence, the factual matter will be
resolved against him either by a directed verdict or by an instruction
the land was essential in order to lead to a conviction; whereas the law is
administered upon the principle that everyone must be taken conclusively to
Know it, without proof that he does Know it. If the accused was conscious
that the act was one which he ought not to do, and if that act was at the
same time contrary to the law of the land, he is punishable; and the usual
course therefore has been to leave the question to the jury. . ..
M'Naghten, 10 Cl. & Fin. at 210-211, 8 Eng. Rep. at 723.
104. J. Hall, supra note 31, at 482.
105. Id; see also W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 27, at 276-77.
106. Platt & Diamond, supra note 9, at 1228.
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to the jury. 07 The prevailing rule in the states requires that the accused,
in order to satisfy the initial burden of production must introduce
evidence which raises doubts as to his sanity; 0° federal courts place a
lesser burden on the defendant and merely require the production of
"slight evidence" of insanity.'09 Once the accused has rebutted the initial
presumption of sanity, the question is then which party, the accused or
the prosecution, bears the burden of persuasion." 0
A. The Constitutional Issue
In a criminal case the prosecution bears the burden of persuasion
and must prove all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."'
The issue of sanity is an exception to this general rule. At common
law, the burden of proving insanity was on the defendant."12 In Davis
v. United States,"3 the Supreme Court changed the common law ap-
proach in federal prosecutions and required that the government prove
sanity beyond a reasonable doubt." ' Later decisions by the Court made
it clear that Davis was not of constitutional dimensions and, therefore,
did not apply to the states." 5 Some legal scholars, however, have argued
that, as a result of more recent decisions, the result reached in Davis
has obtained constitutional proportions."16 Nevertheless, the Court in a
107. W. Reese & M. Rosenberg, Cases on Conflict of Laws 416 (8th ed. 1984); W.
LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 27, at 312; see also Mims v. United States, 375 F.2d
135, 140 (5th Cir. 1967); Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 16 S. Ct. 353 (1895);
Note, Constitutional Limitations on Allocating the Burden of Proof of Insanity to the
Defendant in Murder Cases, 56 B.U.L. Rev. 499, 502-3 (1976); Comment, The Insanity
Defense in Criminal Trials-Burden of Proof, 10 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 1037, 1041 (1976).
108. W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 27, at 313.
109. See e.g., Howard v. United States, 232 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1956); see also
W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 27, at 313.
110. W. LaFave & A. Scott. supra note 27, at 312.
111. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970).
112. M'Naghten, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718; see also Davis v. United States,
160 U.S. 469, 16 S. Ct. 353 (1895).
113. 160 U.S. 469, 16 S. Ct. 353 (1895).
114. Id. at 492-93, 16 S. Ct. at 360.
115. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 797, 72 S. Ct. 1002, 1007, reh'g denied, 344
U.S. 848 (1952); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 204-05, 97 S. Ct. 2319, 2324
(1977).
116. The Court held that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof "beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged," In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364, 90 S. Ct. at 1073.
The Court extended this decision in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S. Ct. 1881
(1975). There the Court held that a state homicide statute could not constitutionally place
the burden on the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the killing
had occurred in the heat of passion, id. Scholars argued that a logical extension of these
decisions precluded states from placing the burden of persuasion, in insanity cases, on
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series of decisions has indicated that it will reject these arguments." 7
Thus, under the present interpretation of the Constitution, Congress
may place upon the defendant the burden of proving insanity by clear
and convincing evidence.
B. Arguments for Allocating the Burden of Persuasion
Who bears the burden of persuasion in a legal case is a matter of
considerable practical importance." 8 This is especially true in the case
of the insanity defense because of the inherent uncertainties involved in
determining sanity or insanity." 9 The case of John Hinckley supports
such a conclusion. In Hinckley where the federal prosecutor had to
prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury returned a verdict of
insanity because they thought Hinckley "might not have been sane."' 20
Although it is believed that the effect of assigning the burden of per-
suasion to the defendant will decrease the number of successful defenses,
this conclusion has not yet been tested.'2'
Determining which party bears the burden of proving sanity also
has a significant theoretical ramification. Society presumes that individ-
uals who are free to come and go as they please are rational and act
with some purpose.'22 The criminal law reflects this notion and "pos-
tulates a free agent confronted with a choice between doing right and
wrong . -."I If the law places upon the prosecution the burden of
persuasion after the accused has merely introduced some evidence of
abnormality, this postulate is reversed.
The difficulties are compounded if the jurisdiction employs a "sci-
entific" definition of insanity. Under the "scientific" definition insanity
the defendant. In their views mens rea and sanity were identical, and thus sanity, like
mens rea, became an essential element necessary to constitute a crime. Comment, 10
Suffolk U.L. Rev. 1037, supra note 107, at 1060-61; Note 56 B.U.L. Rev. 499, supra
note 107, at 510; see also United States v. Greene 489 F.2d 1145, 1180 (D.C.Cir. 1973),
cert denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974) (Bazelon, J., statements as to why he would grant reh'g
en banc).
117. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 207, 97 S. Ct. at 2325; Jones v. United States, 103 S.
Ct. 3043, 3051 n. 17 (1983); see also Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877, 97 S. Ct. 226
(1976) (appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question).
118. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 63 S. Ct. 246 (1942) (held that
the maritime rule that a party relying upon a seaman's release has the burden of proving
the validity of the release, when the release, although a procedural rule, was an intergral
part of the substantive right and thus displaced state laws).
119. Legislative History, supra note 45, 226-31; American Psych. Assoc., supra note
1, at 18; Lyons, 731 F.2d at 249 ("an all but impossible task.
120. N.Y. Times, June 23, 1982, at B6, col. 5.
121. American Psych. Assoc., supra note 1, at 18.
122. J. Hall, supra note 31, at 296.
123. Pound, supra note 71, at xxxvi-xxxvii.
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is a pattern of behavior which when compared to normal behavior is
so different that it may be classified as insanity. 2 4 The prosecution under
this standard must prove sanity by arguing that the accused's criminal
actions and any other behavioral nuances are actually not abnormal.215
If the prosecutor is working in a jurisdiction which employs the M'Nagh-
ten-styled test, this anomaly would be somewhat lessened since the ability
to distinguish right from wrong is not necessarily coterminous with
normality. Some may argue that because the accused must rebut the
initial presumption of sanity with some evidence, the basic premise that
an individual who interacts in everyday society is sane remains intact.
However, by meeting this initial burden the accused has only proven
that his behavior evidences neither a lack of purpose nor abnormality
sufficient to constitute insanity. His behavior is such that the issue of
insanity should be given to the jury. 2 6
1. Jurisdictions Placing the Burden on the Prosecution'
At present eleven states require the prosecution, once a defendant
introduces evidence of insanity, to bear the burden of proving the
dtefendant was sane beyond a reasonable doubt.121 Some jurisdictions
adopting this approach give no evidentiary value to the initial pre-
sumption of sanity, and if the prosecutor fails to introduce sufficient
evidence from which the jury could find the accused sane he will be
acquitted. Other jurisdictions will give the issue of insanity to the jury
even though the prosecution has not introduced any evidence which
124. Szasz, supra note 3, at A10, col. 6.
125. J. Hall, supra note 31, at 450.
126. Id; see also Szasz, supra note 3, at AI0, col. 6.
127. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-8-105(2) (1978); Farrell v. State, 101, So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla.
1958); State v. Thomas, 219 N.W.2d 3 (Iowa 1974); State v. Boan, 235 Kan. 800, 686
P.2d 160 (1984); Commonwealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 350 N.E.2d 444 (1976); People
v. McKeeve, 332 N.W.2d 596, 598 (Mich. App. 1983); N.M. Jud. Pamplet 19, ch. 41.00
(1982); see also State v. White, 58 N.M. 324, 270 P.2d 727 (1954); Rogers v. State, 634
P.. 2d 743, (Okla. Crim. 1981); State v. Kost, 290 N.W.2d 482 (S.D. 1980); State v.
Clayton, 656 S.W.2d 344 (Tenn. 1983).
Prior to the passage of Public Law 98-473 the federal courts had placed the burden
of proof upon the prosecutor. In Davis, 160 U.S. 469, 16 S. Ct. 353, the Supreme Court
held that sanity was an element that the prosecution had the burden of proving, id. at
493. This rule has been uniformly followed in the federal courts. See e.g., Lynch v.
Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 82 S. Ct. 1063 (1962); United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243,
249 (5th Cir. 1984)(en banc); United States v. White, 447 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1971); Mason
v. United States, 402 F.2d 732 (8th Cir. 1968); Webber v. United States, 395 F.2d 397
(10th Cir. 1968); Keys v. United States, 346 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Beltran v. United
States, 302 F.2d 48 (ist Cir. 1962); Hall v. United States, 295 F.2d 26 (4th Cir. 1961);
United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961).
See also Note, 56 B.U.L. Rev., supra note 107, at 504; W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra
note 27, at 313.
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would tend to prove sanity. 21 Jurisdictions placing the burden of per-
suasion on the prosecution view sanity as a requisite element for the
formulation of a mental state necessary for criminal behavior; hence,
they require the state to prove it.129 Professor Abraham Goldstein argues
that this method is more equitable since indigent defendants may be
unable to finance an insanity defense while the state has access to both
funds and experts. 30 Professor Goldstein's argument has been undercut
by a recent supreme court decision. In Ake v. Oklahoma the Court
held that when a defendant, charged with a capital offense, has made
a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense is likely
to be a significant factor at trial, the Constitution requires government
to ensure access to a competent psychiatrist.' 3'
2. Jurisdictions Placing the Burden on the Defendant
Thirty-six states, 3 2 the District of Columbia,'33 and all the federal
courts assign the burden of persuasion to the defendant, who must prove
128. W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 27, at 313; see United States v. Bass, 490
F.2d at 851-52 (The Fifth Circuit had required the prosecutor to introduce evidence from
which the jury could find sanity otherwise the judge would find the accused insane.).
129. Note, 56 B.U.L. Rev., supra note 107, at 505.
130. A. Goldstein, supra note 41, at 123-24, 127, 136.
131. 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985). Although the court writes in terms broad enough to
include all defendants, the facts and concurring opinion of Justice Burger, 105 S. Ct. at
1099, and the dissenting opinion by Justice Rehnquist indicate that the Constitutional
right applies only to defendant's charged with a capital offense, 105 S. Ct. at 1099.
132. Wherry v. State, 402 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981) (preponderance); Alaska
Stat. §§ 12.47.010, 12.47.030, 11.81.900(b) (1983 & 1984); (preponderance); Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 13-502(b)(Supp. 1984) (clear and convincing); Gruzen v. State, 267 Ark.
380, 591 S.W.2d 342 (1979), cert denied, 449 U.S. 852, 101 S. Ct. 144 (1980) (prepon-
derance); Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 1369 (1982) (preponderance); Del Code Ann. tit. 11
§§ 304, 401 (1979 & Supp. 1984, (preponderance); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 53a-12
(1972), 53a-13a (Supp. 1984) (preponderance); Durham v. State, 239 Ga. 697, 238 S.E.
2d 334, 336 (1977) (preponderance); Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 704-402, 701-115(b) (1976 &
Supp. 1983) (preponderance); I11. Stat. Ann. § 38-6-2(e) (Supp. 1984) (preponderance);
Ind. Code Ann. § 35-41-4-1(b) (1979) (preponderance); Edwards v. Commonwealth, 554
S.W.2d 380 (Ky. 1977) (to satisfaction of the jury); State v. Clark, 305 So. 2d 457 (La.
1974) (preponderance); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A § 39 (1983) (preponderance); Md.
Health Gen. Code Ann. § 12-109 (Supp. 1984) (preponderance); Minn. Stat. Ann. §
611.026 (Supp. 1984) (preponderance); see also State v. Bott, 310 Minn. 331, 246 N.W.
2d 48 (1976); Edwards v. State, 441 So. 2d 84 (Miss. 1983)(en banc) (preponderance);
Mo. Stat. Ann. § 552.030(7) (Supp. 1985) (preponderance); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2203
(1984) (preponderance); Guynes v. State. 92 Nev. 693, 558 P.2d 626 (1976) (preponderance);
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 628.2(11) (Supp. 1982) (preponderance); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:
4-1 (1982) (preponderance); N.Y. Penal Law §§ 40. 15 (Supp. 1984), 25.00(2) (1975)
(preponderance); State v. Ward, 301 N.C. 469, 272 S.E.2d 84 (1980) (to satisfaction of
the jury); State v. Jenson, 251 N.W.2d 182 (N.D. 1977) (preponderance); State v. Brown,
5 Ohio St. 3d 133, 449 N.E.2d 449 (1983); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 161.305, 161.055 (1983)
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his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence'34 or as adopted by
Congress, by the higher standard of "clear and convincing evidence."'"
Such an approach is based on the belief that if the rule were different
it would be too easy for the sane defendant to avoid criminal respon-
sibility by merely creating some doubt as to his sanity. 36
A better argument, however, has been made by Professor Bonnie.
He has suggested that the general rule "disfavoring burden shifting"
should not apply to the insanity defense. Other defenses, such as self-
defense and duress, which place the burden of persuasion on the pros-
ecution are "linked to external realities and can be tested against ordinary
experience, thereby reducing the likelihood of successful fabrication or
jury confusion.' 37 The plea of insanity, on the other hand, is a claim
by the defendant that he suffers from a "mental disorder that disabled
him from functioning as a normal person ... [but which] is not linked
to the external world and by definition cannot be tested against ordinary
experience." 3
C. Congressional Allocation of the Burden of Proof
Congress has adopted an insanity defense which places the burden
of persuasion on the defendant. The standard adopted is proof by clear
and convincing evidence,3 9 a higher standard than that used by most
(preponderance); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 18 § 315(a) (1983); State v. Young, 238 S. Ct. 115,
119 S.E. 2d 504 (preponderance), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 868, 82 S. Ct. 101 (1961); Tex.
Penal Code Ann. §§ 8.01(a) (Supp. 1985), 2.04 (1974) (preponderance); Vt. Stat. tit. 13
§ 4801(b) (Supp. 1984); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 316, 157 S.E.2d 185 (1967)
(preponderance); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A: 12.010(2) (1977) (preponderance); State
v. McCauley, 130 W. Va. 43 S.E.2d 454 (preponderance); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 971.15(3)
(1971) (by greater weight of credible evidence); Wyo. Stat. § 7-11-305(b) (Supp. 1984)(by
greater weight of the evidence).
133. D.C. Code Ann. § 24-3010) (1981) (preponderance).
134. Three states, however, place a more difficult burden of proof upon the accused
who pleads insanity, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-502(b) (Supp. 1984) (by clear and
convincing evidence); Edwards v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d 380 (Ky. 1977) (to the
satisfaction of the jury); State v. Ward, 301 N.C. 469, 272 S.E. 2d 84 (1980) (to the
satisfaction of the jury).
135. Pub. L. No. 98-473, supra note 6, at 2057.
136. Legislative History, supra note 45, at 230. ("[J]udges, prosecutors and defense
counsel roundly denounce the Herculean task of requiring the Government to prove anyone
is not insane beyond a reasonable doubt.") (statement by Edwin Miller of the National
Dist. Att. Assoc.); Kuh, supra note 25, at 776 ("If the prosecution must prove that the
disease was absent ... and must do so by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, then-
assuming that juries are able to and do follow insructions-the prosecution can seldom
be successful.").
137. Bonnie, supra note 27, at 197.
138. Id.
139. Legislative History, supra note 45, at 230.
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states. The choice, of a "more rigorous" standard, was made to "assure
that only those defendants who plainly satisfy the requirements of the
defense are exonerated.' 40
The legislative history suggests two rationales for the shift, both of
which reflect a practical approach to criminal law.' 4' First it relieves the
prosecutor of the difficulties associated with proving sanity. 142 As already
noted, allocation of the burden on the prosecutor can preclude a con-
viction merely because the jury is "unsure." Congress found that of
the two, prosecutor and defendant, the latter has access to evidence
which would establish insanity while evidence of sanity is "frequently
unavailable.' '1 3 Second, Congress as a matter of public policy concluded
that the defense of insanity, because it excuses an individual from all
responsibility, is a defense which in all fairness to society should only
be granted if society is absolutely sure that the defendant falls within
the exception.'"
D. Conclusion
In the words of Judge Bazelon, former Chief Judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia: "The so-called
insanity defense reflects society's unwillingness to impose condemnation
and punishment when it cannot impose blame.' 1 45 Thus, when Congress
changes the definition of criminal insanity it alters the threshold at which
society finds that one can be deemed blameworthy or morally culpable
for one's actions. However, as noted by Professor Goldstein, it is
questionable whether juries pay much attention to standards such as
M'Naghten 46 because even if the jury understands psychiatric testimony
which indicates that the defendant is insane, it is the jury's duty to
determine the ultimate question of insanity. Thus, according to Professor
Goldstein, the change of the definition may reduce the use of expert
testimony, and it may alter criminal law in a theoretical manner, but
its effect on a jury's decision to find that the accused is insane may
be slight. "47 Shifting the burden of proof, however, although not as
theoretically significant, should decrease the number of successful insanity
pleas. Although the American Psychiatric Association suggests that em-
140. Id.
141. See e.g., United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3420 (1984) (adopting a good
faith exception for fourth amendment exclusionary rule).
142. Legislative History, supra note 45, at 230.
143. Id. (statements by Edwin Miller).
144. Id.
145. Bazelon, Can Pyschiatry Humanize the Law? 7 Psych. Annals 29, 30 (1977).
146. A. Goldstein, supra note 41, at 62-63.
147. Id.
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pirical studies be done before such a conclusion is made,' 48 this author
suggests that common sense is a sufficient basis on which to conclude
that Congress by placing the burden of proving insanity on the defendent
will reduce the number of insanity pleas. 49
Henry T. Miller
148. American Psych. Assoc., supra note 1, at 13.
149. N.Y. Times, June 23, 1983, at B6, col. 5.
